The recent suicide bombing outside Quetta’s Shahwani Stadium, claimed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), has reignited concerns over Pakistan’s reliance on jihadist proxies to suppress political dissent while portraying itself as a global victim of terrorism.

The September 2 attack, which occurred just hours after a Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M) rally, left 15 people dead and 32 injured. Analysts point out that ISKP, a Daesh affiliate typically known for targeting religious minorities and security convoys, seldom directs its violence at political gatherings in Balochistan. This unusual targeting has fueled suspicions that the bombing carried a deeper political message.

“The Quetta blast, tied to politics this time, only deepens concern that Pakistan cannot control its own backyard,” Dawn quoted a Quetta-based analyst as saying. For Tehran, still reeling from ISKP’s deadly Kerman bombing earlier this year, the incident underscores the ease with which militants operate across the Pakistan-Iran border.

Pakistan’s contradictory counterterrorism policy has long been the subject of international scrutiny. Veteran journalist Ahmed Rashid, in his book Descent into Chaos, argued that Islamabad positioned itself as Washington’s ally after 2001 while simultaneously sheltering Taliban fighters. Similarly, political scientist C. Christine Fair has described this as a dual approach of “fighting some terrorists while backing others.”

The Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), in its 2024 annual report, also warned of Islamabad’s increasing use of paramilitary forces and militant proxies to manage domestic dissent. The Quetta bombing, analysts suggest, may represent another manifestation of this calibrated violence—with ISKP acting as the latest tool.

Meanwhile, Baloch armed groups have vowed retaliation. A spokesperson for the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) accused Islamabad of “using Daesh against our people,” signaling the possibility of heightened attacks on Pakistani security forces in Quetta, Gwadar, and along routes critical to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

While Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and President Asif Ali Zardari swiftly condemned the bombing, critics dismissed their statements as hollow. As one columnist noted, “You cannot claim to fight extremism while keeping extremists as your tools.”

The Quetta attack not only highlights the enduring threat of ISKP but also intensifies questions about Pakistan’s internal contradictions in dealing with militancy—contradictions that may further destabilize an already volatile region.